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Recent years have witnessed the trend of increasingly relying on remote and distributed
infrastructures, mainly owned and managed by third parties. This increased the
number of reported incidents of security breaches compromising users’ personal
data, where involved entities may massively collect and process massive amounts
of such data. Toward these challenges, this paper combines hierarchical Identity
Based Cryptographic (IBC) mechanisms with emerging blockchain technologies and
introduces a blockchain-based data usage auditing architecture ensuring availability
and accountability in a personal data-preserving fashion. The proposed approach relies
on smart auditable contracts deployed in blockchain infrastructures. Thus, it offers
transparent and controlled data access, sharing and processing, so that unauthorized
entities cannot process data without data subjects’ consent. Moreover, thanks to the
usage of hierarchical ID-based encryption and signature schemes, the proposed solution
protects and ensures the confidentiality of users’ personal data shared with multiple
data controllers and processors. It also provides auditing capacities with tamper-proof
evidences for data usage compliance, supported by the intrinsic properties of the
blockchain technology.
Keywords: blockchain, personal data protection, data usage auditing, hierarchical ID-based Cryptography,
user-centric, GDPR, accountability
1. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, organizations are collecting large amounts of personal and sensitive data about
individuals. The most sensitive data are the most valuable for emerging technologies and
applications, namely Artificial Intelligence (AI). Medical records, financial statements, location
history, or voice transcripts may all be processed by AI algorithms to provide services that improve
individuals’ daily lives. This raises the question of the transparency of usage and protection of the
collected personal data. Indeed, in several settings, users have little or no control over the data
collected and stored about them and how they are used.
Several approaches have been introduced in order to address personal data confidentiality issues,
from both legislative and technical perspectives. Indeed, strong authentication and authorization
mechanisms based on centralized trusted authorities, emerged for protecting the rights and
freedom of the citizens especially for ensuring the right of the protection of personal data
and privacy.
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In 2018, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
came into force for effectively ensuring the protection of the data
subject’s personal data [Regulation (EU), 2016]. In particular, the
regulation clarifies the conditions under which it is compulsory
to obtain the consent of the data subject before processing his
personal data, especially for sensitive personal data and data
relating to minors. The GDPR also introduces the new obligation
of accountability for organizations (i.e., data processors and data
controllers). Indeed, each entity processing personal data must
be able to demonstrate at any times that it is complying with the
obligations laid down by the GDPR.
Recently, various accountable technical systems gained an
expanding interest, such as Bitcoin that permits users to transfer
crypto-currencies (i.e., bitcoins) securely without relying on any
centralized entities, thanks to a publicly verifiable open ledger,
known as blockchain. Thanks to their main intrinsic properties,
i.e., tamper-proof infrastructure and availability, blockchain
technologies are nowadays widely adopted for data accounting
and auditing features.
1.1. Contributions
This paper introduces “a blockchain-based scheme for data
usage auditing while preserving personal data confidentiality
and ensuring continuous data availability. The proposed scheme
relies on hierarchical ID-based cryptographic techniques, where
a central master authority delegates the process of public/private
keys’ generation to the different participating entities, based
on authentic public elements” (Laurent et al., 2018). ID-based
Encryption (IBE) and Signature (IBS) schemes enable the data
subject to encrypt sensitive data and sign transactions, relying on
a unique—yet un-identifiable—identifier, respectively.
The proposed solution is multi-fold. First, relying on a
blockchain infrastructure, it provides a trusted and transparent
environment that permits service providers to collect tamper-
proof evidence of received users’ consent before gathering,
storing, and/or processing their personal data. Second, the
proposed framework improves the transnational consent secrecy.
“That is, every data subject acts as a delegated PKG by computing
an ID-based pair of keys to encrypt/sign the data that he intends
to share with either a data controller or a data processor. As
such, the data access is managed by the data subject. Third, by
using a per smart contract ID-based key, we provide a flexible
and secure sharing approach” (Laurent et al., 2018). In fact, the
distribution of the decrypting keys between the data subject and
the authorized data controllers and processors, does not leak the
personal data of the data subject. Fourth, compared to closely
related techniques, the proposed solution ensures acceptable
processing overheads at both the data owner and the service
provider sides.
1.2. Paper1Organization
Section 2 introduces the problem statement. Section 3 reviews the
blockchain-based technology and discusses related work. Section
4 introduces hierarchical ID-based cryptographic techniques.
1This paper is an extended and revised version of our former conference work
accepted in Kaaniche and Laurent (2017b). Some excerpts of previous publications
of the authors (Kaaniche and Laurent, 2017b,c; Laurent et al., 2018) are quoted in
the paper from time to time.
Section 5 discusses design requirements and highlights security
and functional concerns. Section 6 details our proposed solution.
Section 7 gives a security analysis of our approach and section 8
concludes the paper.
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
According to the GDPR, the data subject’s consent is given
for specific purposes that must be compliant to both the data
controller and the data processor. In this context, three main
roles are defined. The data subject who gives his consent to a
data controller (i.e., organization, enterprize) for the processing
of his personal data, with the possibility to forward them to a
data processor (i.e., organization, enterprize) that may process
data on behalf of the data controller. Here data controllers are
responsible for (i) specifying to the data subject the purpose of
data collection, (ii) obtaining the data subject’s consent, and (iii)
processing personal data according to the consented purposes,
and not beyond. We note that for ease of presentation, the
remainder of the paper refers to the data subject as the data owner
and to both the data controller as well as the data processor as the
service provider.
From a data owner perspective, there is a need for new security
mechanisms that support data accountability and provenance
auditing. In a nutshell, these solutions have to ensure that
personal data were accessed by data controllers and/or forwarded
to data processors. Indeed, it is important to conceive a secure
and transparent solution that permits data owners to (i) check
that data controllers and processors are correctly using their
personal data with respect to the consented purposes, (ii) verify
whether data were accessed, processed, or forwarded without
their consent, and (iii) withdraw their consent. From a data
controller or processor perspective, there is a need to design a
trusted and transparent accountability solution that enables them
to get a proof of the data owner’s given consent prior to gathering,
accessing, processing, or storing his personal data.
3. BLOCKCHAIN-BASED TECHNOLOGY
This section reviews blockchain technologies (cf. section 3.1) and
discusses related work (cf. section 3.2).
3.1. Background
Blockchain has gained an attractive interest, since 2008, with the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in the United States. The root
source of this economic crisis is the centralized payment system
that relies on clearinghouses, acting as intermediate entities
between sellers and buyers in an opaque fashion, and adding a
significant extra cost to any inter-bank transactions.
“Bitcoin2 appeared as an innovative technology enabling
users to directly transfer cryptocurrencies in between with
no intermediaries. It is considered as the first decentralized
cryptocurrency transfer system. It relies on cryptographic proofs
of work, digital signatures, and peer-to-peer networking to
provide a distributed ledger containing transactions, and referred
to as a blockchain. A blockchain is essentially a public ledger
2https://bitcoin.org/en/
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of transactions or events recorded and stored in chronologically
connected blocks (Swan, 2015; Crosby et al., 2016; Kaaniche and
Laurent, 2017b).”
Two approaches, referred to as permissionless blockchains,
have emerged to implement decentralized public services and
applications.
“The first approach relies on the existing Bitcoin-blockchain
and builds a new framework on top of it. The main advantage of
this approach is that the Bitcoin blockchain already exists and is
adopted by many users, which makes it more secure, transparent
and resilient. The disadvantage is that blocks are mined every 10
min, and the Bitcoin scripting language is not Turing-complete
(Swan, 2015).
The second approach is to build an alternative blockchain with
all the desired features, which promises full decentralization, such
as Ethereum3. Additionally to functions already supported by
other public blockchain platforms such as bitcoin, e.g., mining
of the digital currencies and transaction management, Ethereum
also provides a contract functionality known as smart contract.
Transactions submitted to the Ethereum environment are
organized into blocks and chained to each other based on a
cryptographic hash function, initially relying on a pre-computed
genesis block. Once a block is added to the blockchain, it
cannot be modified or removed for two reasons: first, a block
modification would lead to wrong verification of the chain of
hash values, and second, the block modification would require
intensive efforts to change every replicate of the blockchain
supposed to be hosted on a large number of independent nodes.
The verification of transactions and the addition of new blocks
to the blockchain relies on the so called mining process. Indeed,
miners have to solve a cryptographic challenge and winners
are rewarded (Wood, 2014)”, Laurent et al. (2018), referred to
as PoW.
Recently, permissioned blockchains are gaining an expanding
interest across multiple industries. “This concept appeared as
a promoting solution for business applications of blockchain
technology and distributed ledgers, in which participants do not
necessarily have full trust on each, yet requiring some means of
identification” (Kaaniche and Laurent, 2017b).
“Unlike permissionless blockchains, there exists a central
entity that decides and grants the right to individual peers
to participate in the read/write operations. The Hyperledger4
project is a prominent initiative dedicated to bringing blockchain
technologies to business. It provides a modular consensus
protocol, such as Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) algorithm,
that ensures efficient scalability and performance complexities
with thousands of transactions per second (Kaaniche and
Laurent, 2017b; Vukolic, 2017).” Hyperledger development and
support are today ensured by a large consortium of world-leading
companies. Among prominent instances of permissionned
blockchains, we can mention IBM Hyperledger Fabric5 and R3
Corda6.
3https://www.ethereum.org/
4https://www.hyperledger.org/
5https://www.hyperledger.org/projects/fabric
6https://www.corda.net/
3.2. Related Work
Several solutions have been proposed aiming at empowering
data owners while giving them -complete- control over their
collected and processed personal data. These solutions mainly
investigate the mechanisms that help setting-up an informed
consent between the data owner and data controllers/processors,
for the different provided applications/services (Laurent, 2019;
Lee et al., 2019; Morel et al., 2019; Rantos et al., 2019).
Morel et al. (2019) proposed a framework for gathering
data owners consents in IoT environments. In their design, the
authors assume that each device collecting data has to send
an attestation about the collected and generated information.
This information includes the device location, the data types,
and privacy policies. The data owner receives the information
via a smartphone and gives consent if accepts to share his
data. Rantos et al. (2019) introduced a cloud-based platform,
called ADVOCATE, which allows users to easily access their
personal data and manage consents. The gathered data, from
IoT devices, are searchable and can only accessed by authorized
entities. Data controllers and processors should submit a query
when they want to access the data generated by a specific
equipment. And, the query has to clearly specify the purpose
of access, the purpose of processing, the period of storage,
etc. Once a query is negotiated and accepted by the data
owner, the consent has to be signed by both the data owner
and the data controller, and stored for auditing purposes. The
proposed solution suggests the deployment of a blockchain-
based infrastructure to ensure that no modification will be made
on given consents. In fact, the main intrinsic property of the
blockchain is its suitability for data auditing purposes. It has
attracted interest of the research community due to its shared
and fault-tolerance database (Zyskind et al., 2015; Linn and Koo,
2016; Ouaddah et al., 2016; Fu et al., 2017; Liang et al., 2017;
Shetty et al., 2017; Kaaniche and Laurent, 2018; Ramachandran
and Kantarcioglu, 2018; Zhang et al., 2018).
“Liang et al. (2017) proposed a blockchain-based data
provenance architecture for cloud applications. Their
construction records operations’ history as provenance data
which are hashed into Merkle tree nodes. A list of hashes of
provenance data forms a Merkle tree which are attached as a
blockchain transaction. As such, it is possible to immutably
prove the provenance of data exchanges. Although the proposed
approach is novel, it does not cover the definition of advanced
policies or contracts regulating the usage of collected data”
(Kaaniche and Laurent, 2017b).
Zyskind et al. (2015) presented an hybrid solution for
personal-data management. The proposed system combines
both blockchain, as an access moderator, and off-blockchain,
for data storage purposes. Proposal Zyskind et al. (2015)
considers clients as unique owners of their personal data,
thus making them aware of all the associated data being
collected by service providers and how they are used. That
is, when a client subscribes to a service provider, one
transaction is created defining the set of access policies and
another contains the hashes of data stored in an off-chain
database. However, the Zyskind et al. (2015) proposal permits
to only define simple permit/deny access policies through
white/blacklisting.
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Based on Zyskind et al. (2015), “Linn et al. propose an
application of the data auditing framework for health scenarios
(Linn and Koo, 2016). In their construction, the blockchain is
also considered as an access moderator to control the access to
outsourced shared data” (Laurent et al., 2018). Fu et al. (2017)
introduced a privacy-aware blockchain-based auditing system for
shared data in cloud applications. In order to mitigate the power
abuse of single tracing authorities, Fu et al. (2017) presents “a
threshold approach, where at least t entities have to collaborate
to recover the identity of a malicious user, ensuring thus the
non-frameability of users. Based on a blockchain architecture, the
proposed construction enables group users to trace data changes
and recover latest correct data blocks when current data are
damaged” (Kaaniche and Laurent, 2017b). Later, “Neisse et al.
discussed the design requirements of blockchain-based solutions
for data provenance tracking (Neisse et al., 2017), namely client-
centric, server-centric, and data-centric approaches. The authors
also presented an evaluation of their implementation results,
in order to give a comprehensive overview of different defined
approaches” (Laurent et al., 2018).
Dorri et al. (2017) introduced an architecture for data access
control management in IoT environments, i.e., smart home
application. The architecture relies on a central–unique–miner,
i.e., local home miner, to mine blocks, and implement the access
policy. The proposed solution ensures the confidentiality of data
through a predefined policy, however the introduction of a
central miner raises the risk of a single point of failure.
Shetty et al. (2017) proposed a blockchain-based auditing
framework, called BlockCloud. The proposed solution supports
“monitoring user activities in real-time using hooks and listeners
which are special classes of event listeners so that every user
operation on files will be collected and recorded for generating
provenance data. Each piece of provenance information is
referred to as transactions that are broadcasted to the core of the
blockchain network created by a specific set of validating virtual
machines” (Tosh et al., 2018). “The provenance auditor validates
provenance data by retrieving transactions from the blockchain
network by using blockchain receipt which contains block and
transaction information” (Shetty et al., 2017).
Later, Ramachandran et al. introduced SmartProvenance
(Ramachandran and Kantarcioglu, 2018), a blockchain-based
auditing solution which applies Ethereum smart contracts to
support the data provenance feature. Indeed, their proposed
solution is based on two smart contracts, namely Document
Tracker contract and Vote contract. The Document Tracker
smart contract is used to keep track of changes to a given
document while the Vote contract implements the voting
protocol. That is, “every provenance change event has to be
approved through a voting process by the vote contract. The
data trails are only logged if they are approved by the Vote
contract. The Vote contract implements two types of voting:
simple majority voting and threshold voting” (Ramachandran
and Kantarcioglu, 2018) where all blockchain network’s minors
are called to participate in the voting process. SmartProvenance
implements a JavaScript client, run on the browser of each of
the user’s machines. The client, acting as an interface between
the user and back-end smart contracts, is in charge of the
synchronization with the smart contract, including the storage,
the retrieval, and the validity checking of the changes.
Zhang et al. (2018) introduced an auditing scheme for cloud
storage environments, based on a blockchain infrastructure. The
proposed solution aims at counteracting provenance records’
forgery, removal, and modification attacks. That is, each
provenance record is anchored into a blockchain-transaction,
and all the provenance records associated with a data item
constitute a record chain. Thus, if one record entry is corrupted,
the chain is broken.
Table 1 provides a comparison between the proposed scheme
and most-closely related solutions, in terms of functional
and security features and incurred computation overheads
at the data owners and processors’ sides. The Blockchain
technology indicates whether the proposed schemes is relying
on a permissionned or permission-less blockchain. The mining
process indicates the consensus algorithm. The confidentiality,
unlinkability, and anonymity properties (detailed in section 5)
refer to the secrecy of personal data, unlinkability between
different transactions and anonymity of the data owner,
respectively. The performances at the data owner and service
providers sides indicate the processing overheads.
4. IDENTITY BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY
Introduced by Shamir (1985), Identity Based Cryptography (IBC)
enables the derivation of public and private keys with no need
for a certification authority. Indeed, each entity should use one
of its—unique—identifiers as its public key. Rather than relying
on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), IBC assigns the private
key generation function to a third party, referred to as a Public
Key Generator (PKG). Thus at the request of an entity, the PKG
computes the private key associated with his public key.
In order to be able to derive an entity’s private key skE , the
PKGmust first define a set of ID-based public elements (IBC–PE).
The PKG generates the groups G1, G2, and GT and the pairing
function eˆ fromG1×G2 inGT .G1 andG2 are additive subgroups
of the group of points of an Elliptic Curve (EC). However,GT is a
multiplicative subgroup of a finite field.G1,G2, andGT have the
same order q. In addition, G1, G2, and GT are generated by P, Q
and the generator g = eˆ(P,Q), respectively.
The PKG defines the groups and a set of hash functions in
accordance to the selected ID-based encryption and signature
schemes. That is, the PKG uses a hash function Hashpub() to
transform the entity’s identity (IDE ) into a public key as follows:
pkE = Hashpub(IDE )
Generally, the public key of the entity is computed as a hash of
one of his identities.
The PKG generates an entity’s private key based on a local
secret sPKG ∈ Z
∗
q and a private key generation function
keygen(). The private key is computed as:
skE = keygen(sPKG, pkE )
The groups G1 and G2, the pairing eˆ, the points P, Q, and
Qpub = sPKG.Q, and the hash functions form the ID-based public
Frontiers in Blockchain | www.frontiersin.org 4 April 2020 | Volume 3 | Article 17
Kaaniche et al. User-Centric Data Usage Auditing Scheme
TABLE 1 | Comparison between the proposed solution and most closely related approaches.
Scheme Security and functional properties Performances
Blockchain
technology
Mining process Confidentially Unlinkability Anonymity Owner Service provider
Zyskind et al. (2015) Public BC – X X nPnSγSC nUnSγSC
Neisse et al. (2017) Ethereum POS X X nPnSγSC nUnSγSC
Dorri et al. (2017) Private BC collaborative X – –
Kaaniche and Laurent
(2018)
Ethereum POS X X X γSC + (3γE + γS) γSC + N(6γE + 3γS)
Shetty et al. (2017) Public BC – X X – –
Cloud pricing
Ramachandran and
Kantarcioglu (2018)
Ethereum POS X 2 nPnSγSC nUnSγSC
Zhang et al. (2018) Ethereum POS X X nPnS(γSC + N(2γE + 2γS)) nUnS (γSC + N(2γE + γS))
Our solution Consortium BC PBFT X X X nPnS(γSC + N(γE + γS)) nUnS (γSC + N(γE + γS))
HyperLedger
Fabric
Xand indicate whether the property is supported or not, respectively. –Indicates that the property is not-applicable or non specified. nP, nO, and nS indicate the number of service
providers, owners, and services/applications, respectively. γSC, γE , and γS indicate the processing overhead of a smart contract creation, data encryption/decryption, and data
signature/verification, respectively. N is the number of transactions associated with a smart contract.
elements as follows:
IBC − PE = {G1,G2,GT , q, eˆ, g, P,Q,Qpub,
Hashpub(),H1(), ...,Hk()}.
ID-based cryptography suffers naturally from the key escrow
attack as a PKG knows the owners’ private keys and, if untrusted,
can realize masquerading attacks. To mitigate the key escrow
attack, a hierarchy of PKGs has been proposed in Gentry and
Silverberg (2002) and Horwitz and Lynn (2002), along with the
Hierarchical Identity Based Cryptography (HIBC) to reduce the
workload of the PKG by delegating the private key generation
task to lower level entities, i.e., entities who have already
obtained their private keys. As such, Hierarchical Identity based
Encryption (HIBE) (Horwitz and Lynn, 2002; Gentry and Halevi,
2009; Blazy et al., 2014; Seo and Emura, 2015) and Hierarchical
Identity Based Signature (HIBS) (Gentry and Silverberg, 2002;
Chow et al., 2004; Tian and Huang, 2014) schemes emerged,
as a generalization of IBE and IBS, respectively, to mirror
an organizational hierarchy. That is, an identity at level k of
the hierarchy tree can issue private keys to its descendant
identities, but it cannot decrypt messages intended for
other identities.
HIBE schemes rely on four randomized algorithms, namely:
setup, keygen, encrypt, and decrypt. The setup
algorithm generates system parameters, denoted by IBC–PE and
the master secret key sPKG. Note that the master key corresponds
to the private key at depth 0 and note that an IBE system is a
HIBE where all identities are at depth 1. The keygen algorithm
takes as input an identity ID = {ID1, · · · , IDk} of depth k and
the secret key skE|k−1 of the parent entity {ID1, · · · , IDk−1} of
depth k − 1. It outputs the secret key skE|k. Similarly to IBE,
the encrypt algorithm encrypts messages for an identity using
IBC-PE and the decrypt algorithm decrypts ciphertexts using
the private key.
5. TECHNICAL DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
In this section, we first review different security and functional
requirements (cf. section 5.1). Then, we discuss blockchain
design directions (cf. section 5.2) and deployment models (cf.
section 5.3).
5.1. Security and Functional Requirements
Our blockchain-based data usage auditing solution has to
consider a set of security and functional properties, defined
as follows:
- confidentiality—the proposed approach has to “prevent
unauthorized disclosure of both personal identifying
information and shared data between data owners and service
providers” (Kaaniche and Laurent, 2017b).
- unlinkability—the proposed solution has to guarantee that
created smart contracts by the same data owner can not be
linked by public verifiers as well as service providers.
- auditability—the proposed solution has “to enable auditing
authorities to lead an investigation and obtain consistent
proofs in case of non-compliant activities” (Kaaniche and
Laurent, 2017b). The auditing process, carried by authorized
authorities, may be both public and private.
- censorship resistance—this property defines the ability to
prevent a third-party from pushing false information across
the system (Perng et al., 2005). In fact, service providers are
interested by data owners’ contract creation and joining, thus
allowing them to manage and process data. Otherwise, data
owners have the right to revoke or modify their initial consent
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agreement. As such, service providers will no longer have
access to data, with respect to their granted privileges.
- data transparency—each data owner should have a complete
transparent view over how data are collected, accessed,
and processed.
- computation overhead—the proposed solution should offer
acceptable computation costs.
5.2. Blockchain Design Directions and
Discussions
“To efficiently propose the contract design for each participating
entity, we have to take into consideration (i) the contract lifecycle,
(ii) accountability granularity, (iii) required information to be
stored in the contract, (iv) access patterns w.r.t. read/modify
granted privileges, and (v) blockchain architecture w.r.t. different
models of deployments” (Kaaniche and Laurent, 2017b).
For this purpose, as discussed in Kaaniche and Laurent
(2017c), we distinguish “three different cases for designing
contracts that depend on the number of involved data owners
and processors, as follows:
- M1—one data owner contract per specific data: each data owner
has to create a contract for each data instance for all data
controllers, while specifying access privileges. In a nutshell, the
contract should contain the list of authorized data controllers
as well as their respective granted privileges.
- M2—one data owner contract for each specific data
controller/processor: the data owner creates a contract for
each specific controller processing his personal data. Thus, the
contract includes shared data, access policy w.r.t. data usage
as well as data usage logs that represent the different events
carried out by the data controller on the owner’s personal
data. This contract design model holds the largest number
of contracts and is merely adequate for high security levels
needed, for instance, for e-health data.
- M3—one data controller contract for multiple data owners w.r.t.
data usage policy: for this sub-case, the data controller creates
a generic contract that specifies the manner of processing
data received from data owners. When a data owner joins
the contract established by the data controller, he then
accepts the policy usage identified by the controller. This
model is of interest when expecting a lower number of
different owners.”
“Let us note that the first model (M1) cannot ensure the
unlinkability property because the data owner is known to all
organizations under the same identity. Other cases (i.e., M2 and
M3) allow data owners to protect their identities from linkability
attacks, thanks to the use of different identifiers (i.e., blockchain
addresses). For instance, the first contract design model (M1) is
more scalable, compared to other design models (M2) and (M3),
thanks to the use of a generic instance for data.
It is worth noticing that the aforementioned models are
different in terms of contracts’ number and data auditing
granularity allowed to data owners, depending on the required
security properties” (Kaaniche and Laurent, 2017c).
5.3. Public vs. Semi-public vs. Private
Blockchain
As stated above and as discussed in Kaaniche and Laurent
(2017c), “it is important to consider the blockchain architecture
(public, semi-public, private), as it impacts several security
requirements, mainly public verifiability, unlinkability, and
censorship resistance properties (Swan, 2015).
For instance, a public blockchain architecture, such as Bitcoin
and Ethereum, allows every entity to read, send transactions and
participate in the mining process to decide which blocks are
added to the chain and determine the current blockchain state.
As such, these public distributed ledgers permit to have a fully
transparent system, but with a questionable level of data owners’
linkability. In addition, transactions’ fees have to be paid for
the processing of contract invocations, which could make some
approaches unfeasible due to the high number of transactions,
like for the data owner-centric models (M1, M2). This would
make necessary that data owners and service providers agree on
an adequate business model to avoid owners supporting all the
transaction’ fees.
In a private blockchain architecture, read access may be
public, or restricted, while write privileges have to be granted
by a central entity. In fact, the central entity is responsible
for verifying transactions’ compliance and censorship resistance
with respect to data owners’ policies. Hence, a private system
provides limited transparency, but with significant unlinkability
and personal data protection guarantees. Nevertheless, in a
private blockchain, processing fees may be significantly reduced,
mainly when considering the service provider-centric model M3.
In a semi-public or consortium blockchain infrastructure,
read access may be public or restricted and the consensus process
is controlled by a set of organizations. Thus, a consortium
blockchain architecture inherits several benefits from a private
blockchain technology—efficiency, unlinkability, and personal
data protection guarantees—without relying on one single
deciding authority. Additionally, these permissioned blockchains
often expose some low-level trust assumptions originating from
their consensus mechanism to their smart contract applications,
hence ensuring transparency and auditability. Apart from these
advantages, a consortium blockchain permits to get reduced
transactions’ fees thanks to the consensus algorithm, which could
be considered as a motivating argument for data-owner centric
models, namely M2.”
6. A NEW BLOCKCHAIN-BASED DATA
USAGE AUDITING ARCHITECTURE
Our architecture considers that one smart contract per data
controller/processor is managed by the data owner (M2
model of section 5.2), and relies on a consortium-blockchain
infrastructure, as discussed in section 5.3.
6.1. Overview
Our blockchain-based data usage auditing solution involves the
three following entities: a data owner (O), a service provider (S)
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FIGURE 1 | Blockchain-based architecture for data usage auditing schemes.
(acting as a data controller), and a service provider (P) (acting as
a data processor) [Regulation (EU), 2016].
Figure 1 depicts the different actors and their interactions.
When subscribing to a service provider S , the date owner O
creates first a data usage contract. In this contract, O provides
“the usage policy for both data transferred by O to S , as well as
any other collected data by S during the interactions withO (e.g.,
logging files). When processing O’s data, S has to comply to the
granted usage policy, as registered in the smart contract in the
blockchain. In addition, O needs to identify the list of possible
actions that might be performed on behalf of the smart contract,
including the smart contract approval (cf. section 6.4).
If authorized by the data usage policy in the smart contract,
C might transmit O’s data to service provider P , by pushing that
forwarding information to the blockchain. O being notified by
the forward event, then has to create a new smart contract with
P” (Laurent et al., 2018).
As our approach leans on a consortium-blockchain
infrastructure, for anyone to be able to read the contract as
well as associated transactions, we introduce cryptographic
mechanisms—hierarchical ID-based encryption (HIBE) and
signature (HIBS) schemes—in order to provide secrecy of
exchanged data and preserve data owner’s privacy.
Our approach based on hierarchical IBC has several
advantages. First, each data owner O, as part of the blockchain,
acts as a delegated PKG, thus being enabled to derive an ID-based
pair of keys for encrypting and signing all the data intended to
be shared with S or P . It is noteworthy that the data owner O
remains fully in charge of his data access.
Second, using hierarchical identity based schemes introduces
the existence of a root PKG entity (i.e., a trusted central
entity), which has the responsibility to generate certified public
system parameters IBC–PE, for the entities of the system (O,
P , S) and to guarantee authentic entities identities within the
system. Furthermore, hierarchical identity has the advantage
over the client-PKG classical approach—to provide public system
parameters common to any entities and not specific to the public
identity of the data ownerO. “This feature enablesO to get rid of
the cumbersome tasks of generating and publishing eachO’s own
public parameters, and it provides indistinguishability among
entities, mostly during the signature verification processes”
(Laurent et al., 2018).
Third, having a per smart-contract ID-based key provides
our solution with several properties of interest, including
indistinguishability among smart contracts at the blockchain
level, and unlinkability of smart contracts to data owners. Both
properties prevent any reidentification of data owners thanks to
search operations over the blockchain.
6.2. Security and Design Assumptions
This section first details the security assumptions in section 6.2.1.
Then, it introduces the smart contract design assumptions 6.2.2.
6.2.1. Security Assumptions
Our scheme considers the following security assumptions:
- an off-blockchain secure communication—a secure channel
is established between O and the service provider P or S ,
thus enabling O to securely transmit its personal information
along with some data that he expects to share with the service
provider. The secure channel supports mutual authentication
and data confidentiality and integrity. It can be implemented
through the Transport Layer protocol (TLS) (Dierks and
Rescorla, 2008), where the data owner can authenticate with
a certificate or password. If higher data preservation is
requested, then attribute based credential mechanisms, such as
Idemix7 or UProve8, are good candidates for enabling mutual
authentication while revealing only required information to
any service provider.
- a robust blockchain and smart contract implementation—
any blockchain related operations, including mining and
transaction anchoring activities are assumed to be secure and
incorruptible, and blockchain to deliver non-tamper proofs of
data processing and managing events.
- a trusted PKG entity—the PKG plays a central role, by
enrolling the different entities (O,S ,P) into the system, by
deriving their private keys, and by issuing and publishing
the security ID-based public elements for the whole ID-
based system. In the sequel, in order to strengthen security
guarantees and prevent attacks against this central entity, the
root PKG functions w.r.t. the derivation of private keys may be
distributed among several entities, based on securemulti-party
computation mechanisms or threshold techniques (Yu et al.,
2010; Prabhakaran and Sahai, 2013; Gruma˘zescu et al., 2015).
Note that, in practice, entities should agree on the hierarchical
ID-based encryption and signature schemes which will be used
for ciphering and signing messages, respectively. Our proposal
does not rely on a specific scheme, however, that choice has a
direct impact on the method for generating private keys.
7https://www.zurich.ibm.com/identity_mixer/
8https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/project/u-prove/
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6.2.2. Smart Contract Design Assumptions
“For our solution, each data contract involves two parts: data
structure, referred to as p1 and data usage policy, denoted by
p2. The data structure part, includes types and instances of
exchanged data between the data owner O and the service
provider S” (Laurent et al., 2018). That is, the data type field
contains a list of all data instantiations (i.e., string, integer,
date, . . .), while data instances provide data values. The data
usage policy part identifies all the authorized and denied usage
actions for both transferred and implicitly collected data. Among
data usage actions, we may mention data storage duration
granted to the service provider, type of processing permitted over
the owner’s data, permission to forward data to other service
providers or to generate derived data from some exchanged
personal data [Regulation (EU), 2016].
Furthermore, for each created smart contract, the data owner
O is required to list the actions that are authorized by the smart
contract from O and service providers (S and P). Permitted
actions from O include deletion of the smart contract, in-
activation of the contract and modification of new data usage
policies, and permitted actions from service providers include
only approval of the smart contract content.
6.3. System Initialization
We assume that a trusted root PKG entity is in charge of
generating and publishing the ID-based public elements, along
with the ID-based Signature and Encryption scheme (cf. section
6.2.1), as follows:
IBC − PE = {G1,G2,GT , q, eˆ, g, P,Q,Qpub,
Hashpub(),H1(), ...,Hk(), IBSscheme, IBEscheme}
Moreover, each entity E owns a pair of public and private keys
(skE , pkE ), where E ∈ {O,S ,P}. Each pair of public and private
keys (skE , pkE ) is mathematically generated by the root PKG in
accordance with the selected ID-based cryptographic schemes, as
detailed in section 4. Then the root PKG securely transmits the
private key skE through the secure channel (cf. section 6.2) to the
entity E . As such, E owns his secret skE associated to his public
key pkE where skE is derived from the unique entity identity
of E (i.e., one of E ’s blockchain addresses), based on the PKG’s
own secret and the public elements IBC–PE. “As such, the pair
(pkE , skE ) is somewhat certified by the root PKG, as the signature
generation and data decryption operations require an entity to be
equipped with his own secret skE” (Laurent et al., 2018).
6.4. Smart Contract Creation
Figure 2 gives the full picture of the smart contract creation
from the data usage request by S to O up-to the approval of the
contract by S and transmission of data to S .
First, O establishes a direct secure channel with S where S
andO authenticate each other thanks to their respective (skE and
pkE ) pair of keys (cf. section 6.3). The transaction is identified
with an Tid parameter. Through this channel, S might initiate a
data usage request to O, for O to infer some parameters for the
smart contract C prior to launching the smart contract into the
blockchain. The generation of these parameters is presented in
section 6.4.1, and details of smart contract creation are given in
section 6.4.2.
6.4.1. Generation of Per Smart-Contract Parameters
by O
After the initialization phase, as described in section 6.3,O owns
his public and private keys (skO , pkO), thus making O able to
derive a per smart-contract IDC , with its associated pair of public
and private keys (skC , pkC), as follows.
Based on the public elements IBC–PE, and the hierarchical
ID-based principle, as detailed in section 4, O first generates an
identifier IDC , that constitutes the hierarchical smart contract
identity of depth 2 which relies on both O’s identity IDO and the
smart contract identifier IDC .
Then, thanks to keygen, O derives a per smart contract ID-
based public key pkC based on the general public elements IBC–
PE and the concatenation of the data owner’s address IDO , the
service provider address IDS and the smart contract identifier
IDC .
pkC = Hashpub(IDS ||IDC)
Note that the secret key skC associated with the public key pkC
is only known by the data owner, at the moment of the smart
contract creation.
6.4.2. Creation of the Smart Contract by O
O approves first the data usage request and then constructs
the data section part of the contract by distinguishing parts
p1 and p2, as presented in section 6.2.2. To avoid publishing
personal information, our approach proposes to obfuscate data
values in p1 thanks to the use of the public hash function
H (e.g., SHA-256). To counteract the linkability attacks, we
propose to concatenate data values with a symmetric key
kC,S derived from the generated smart contract secret key
skC before application of the hash function. The derivation
of kC,S has to be unidirectional, through a hashing function
for instance. “Then, O generates a smart contract creation
transaction, which will be anchored in the blockchain. As such,
we define a smart contract creation transaction T as the tuple
T = [Tid, IDC ,UC ,p1,p2, encpkS (kC,S ), σC], where Tid is the
transaction identifier, IDC is the smart contract identifier, UC is a
smart contract approval request identifier toward S , encpkS (kC,S )
is the encrypted symmetric key kC,S , based on the public key
of the service provider S and σC is the signature of O of all the
previous fields, using the private key skC , only known to the data
owner” (Laurent et al., 2018).
After being notified of the smart contract creation request, the
service provider decrypts the enciphered (pairwise) symmetric
key kC,S using the public system parameters IBC–PE, and his
own private key skS . Then, S verifies the signature of the issuing
data owner using the public key pkC . Only if both operations
are successful, S can approve the transaction associated with the
smart contract creation thanks to its own key skS .
Upon receiving the smart contract approval notification, O
transmits his personal data to the service provider, through a
secure channel. The compliance between his personal data and
the hashed values embedded in p1 proves his consent agreement.
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FIGURE 2 | Smart contract creation process.
Then, S can check the integrity of the receivedO’s data based on
the deciphered pairwise key kC,S and the received data values.
6.5. Data Usage Transfer
“In case a forward action is authorized on some O’s data by
the data usage policy specified in the smart contract with S ,
then data might be transferred by the service provider S to the
corresponding data processor P and a transaction has to be
pushed to the blockchain” (Laurent et al., 2018).
“For this purpose, S has to generate a data usage transaction.
As such, the data owner is notified about the service provider
data transfer activity. We define a data usage transaction
T corresponding to a data transfer activity as the tuple
T = [Tid, IDC , IDS ,UC , encpkO (IDP ), σS ], where Tid is the
transaction identifier, IDC is the smart contract identifier, IDS is
the service provider identity,UC is a transfer data event identifier,
encpkO (IDP ) is the encrypted identity of P , based on the public
key of the data owner O and σS is the signature of S over all the
previous fields” (Laurent et al., 2018).
The data owner O being notified of the data transfer creates
a new smart contract with data processor P , following the
procedure presented in section 6.4. Note that P does not know
the identifier of the newly agreed contract betweenO and S .
6.6. Other Operations Over the Smart
Contract
Additionally to the approval of the smart contract by S or P , the
smart contract has to include the following actions:
- deleting the contract from the blockchain by O—In case
O wants to withdraw his data usage consent, the contract
must be made inactive, thus leading to denying any
subsequent data usages. The only possible remaining activity
is the registration of the complete contract history in
the blockchain.
- changing data usage—At any moment, O is able to restrict or
expand his data usages.
Any contract policies modifications must be taken into
consideration in subsequent data usages. This is made possible
thanks to the blockchain notifying any changes w.r.t. the smart
contract, as well as data usage policies embedded into p2, to the
involved entities.
6.7. Auditing
The auditing process can be realized either in a private manner
by the data owner O or by a specialized auditing authority; or
publicly by anyone.
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Public auditing only counts on the transactions’ information
being readable in the blockchain. As such, a public verifier
can detect some non-compliant activities, by comparing any
transactions where a specific data usage activity is reported, with
the smart contract it refers to through its identifier. Indeed, in
case the smart contract does not include the data usage activity
reported in the transaction, a compliance issue is revealed. This
auditing service is made reliable thanks to the tamper-proof
feature of the blockchain, and any transactions being signed by
the service provider.
Private auditing enhanced by a dedicated auditing
organization, relies on public blockchain information, as
well as private data, provided by the claimer. For instance,
when a data owner requests a private audit for a misuse of his
personal data, he shares the private and public keys associated
to the concerned smart contracts (pkCi , skCi ){i∈[1,N]}, where
N is the number of audited smart contracts. As such, the
auditing authority is able to lead an investigation, while crawling
blockchain transactions corresponding to the provided smart
contracts’ identifiers. Having received the smart contracts’
private keys skCi where i ∈ [1,N], the auditing authority is able
to interpret the content of blockchain transactions and to detect
non-compliant activities. We note that private auditing has to be
paid by the audited service provider, if non-compliant activities
are reported.
7. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we first present our threat model. Then, we discuss
the resistance of our construction against data confidentiality,
unlinkability, and availability attacks.
7.1. Threat Model
For designing a secure blokchain-based auditing scheme, we
consider realistic threat models. For instance, our contribution
does not take into consideration malicious services that deviate
from the protocols as we emphasize that service providers stress
about their reputation, in real-world use cases. As such, we
consider that “an attacker is able to read, send and drop a
transaction addressed to the blockchain. The attacker targets data
owners, service providers as well as the blockchain” (Kaaniche
and Laurent, 2017b), as follows:
- based on previous data usage sessions, as well as provided
blockchain data, “an attacker tries to impersonate a data owner
to afford a honest service provider some rights to be logged
into the blockchain without the legal data owner’s consent”
(Kaaniche and Laurent, 2017b). This attack is considered with
respect to the confidentiality and auditability requirement.
- an attacker attempts to thwart the unlinkability feature w.r.t.
data owners. That is, he attempts to link smart contract
identifiers or a smart contract to a specific owner.
- an attacker attempts “to prevent the publication of a legitimate
transaction in the blockchain. For example, in order to prevent
data transfer notification to the data owner, an attacker may
try a DoS attack against a data usage event, or attempt a
flooding attack on the blockchain with invalid data usage
information. This attack is considered against the auditability,
the availability and the censorship resistance requirements”
(Kaaniche and Laurent, 2017b).
7.2. Security Discussion
This section discusses the security properties, with respect to
the defined threat models. Indeed, the confidentiality (section
7.2.1), auditability (section 7.2.3), unlinkability (section 7.2.2),
and availability (section 7.2.4) are analyzed while considering
different adversaries.
7.2.1. Confidentiality
Our proposed solution is resistant against data secrecy attacks for
several reasons here-below listed:
- “only hashed data values and enciphered information
published in the smart contract—the client is in charge of
hashing his personal data for fulfillingp1 of the smart contract,
and enciphering a secret with pkS addressed to server S”
(Laurent et al., 2018).
- the enciphering key kC,S only known by a pair of owner
and service provider—the owner O is the only entity owning
secret skC . As a delegated PKG entity, O is the only entity
able to issue the pair of public and private keys (pkC , skC)
for a specific smart contract. The derived key kC,S being
securely transmitted to the involved service provider, is thus
only known to the owner and the service provider.
- one per smart-contract enciphering key—the pair of keys
(pkC , skC) generated by the owner is specific to a smart
contract, and as such can not leak any information, in case they
are compromised, about other per smart-contract keys.
As the public ledger only registers hashed data values or
encrypted information, no significant information can be learnt
from the blockchain.
7.2.2. Unlinkability
Beyond confidentiality guarantee, the unlinkability property is
ensured in our approach thanks to the following technical
features:
- one smart contract per service provider—each smart contract
is specific to a service provider and has its own identifier
IDC and secret key skC . The owner using this per smart-
contract secret key for signing the contract creation can not
be identified. It is even not possible to link two smart contracts
provided with two different IDC to the same owner.
- unique hashed values within smart contracts—linking smart
contracts in between as issued by the same owner is not
possible, as smart contracts always concatenate data values
with a specific information they own (their pairwise key kC,S )
before hashing. As such, a search over the blockchain ledger
for the same data values (assumed to match the same owner)
is inconclusive.
7.2.3. Auditability
The proposed approach ensures the auditability requirement as
follows:
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- tamper-proof architecture—as emphasized in section 6.2.1,
“all blockchain-specific operations, such as transaction
anchoring activities, are considered as secure and non-
corruptible, thus ensuring non-tamper proofs of data
processing and managing events” (Laurent et al., 2018).
- transparent usage—our approach is based on a consortium
blockchain infrastructure, that permits public access (i.e.,
read privilege) the contract and its associated transactions, to
anyone. Thus, it provides a transparent view over how data are
collected and accessed.
- signed transactions—“our approach relies on signed
transactions. That is, both smart contract creation and
data usage transactions have to be signed by the data owner
O and the service provider S and P , respectively. Signed
transactions ensure that each activity has been efficiently
performed by the holder of the used private key, which is
certified by the PKG entity. As such, the resistance of the
chosen HIBS scheme against forgery attacks has a direct
impact on the fulfillment of the auditability requirement”
(Kaaniche and Laurent, 2017a; Laurent et al., 2018).
- approval of smart contracts creation— the service provider
is requested to approve each smart contract creation by the
data owner O, by using its secret key skS . More precisely, its
secret key enables the service provider to decrypt the pairwise
key kC,S associated to the smart contract, and to prove its
authenticity and its legitimacy to have a deciphered access to
the shared data.
7.2.4. Availability
The blockchain relies on a highly decentralized infrastructure,
thus providing our approach with availability assurance and
liveness guarantees of data usage. We also point out the similarity
between the well known double spending problem in bitcoin
architectures (Karame et al., 2015) and the attack aiming at
preventing a valid transaction to be registered in the blockchain.
Indeed, both assume that an adversary has control over more
than a half of the blockchain nodes, the achievement of which
is assumed difficult (Karame et al., 2015).
8. CONCLUSION
Personal data are highly exposed to data leakage and misuse by
third parties. As such, users have to own a complete control on
their personal data usage without compromising their privacy or
limiting service providers to propose personalized services and
authorities’ ability for auditing activities.
This paper introduces a blockchain-based solution for data
usage auditing relying on both hierarchical ID-based encryption
and signature mechanisms. Each data owner acts as a delegated
PKG, and as such has the technical means to provide consent
on his data usage and to control data collection and processing
activities based on a per smart-contract approach, while enabling
service providers to provide the evidence that any personal
data processing was previously subjected to the consent by
the data owner. Indeed, based on a consortium blockchain
infrastructure, the proposed solution first enables the data owner
to grant consent to service providers, specify their data access
policy and track data usage flows in a trusted and privacy-
preserving manner. Second, it provides a regulatory framework
to properly enforce the legislation Regulation (EU) (2016). “For
instance, in case of a non-compliance activity (i.e., unauthorized
data access) reported by a data owner, authorized authorities
may lead an investigation referring to as registered blockchain
transactions with respect to concerned entities” (Laurent et al.,
2018). Third, it helps in resolving availability concerns as
blockchain transactions are replicated a large number of times
on independent nodes.
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